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 The University of California (UC) and its notorious 1949 loyalty oath scandal 
may be the most popular and widely discussed case study of post-WWII political 
repression within American universities, but it was not the first casualty.  That "honor" 
goes to the University of Washington (UW) in 1946, a year before President Truman 
enacted Executive Order 9835 requiring federal employees to sign oaths of loyalty to the 
US Constitution.  That year, Washington became one of the first states to create its own 
internal fact-finding committee on un-American activities.  And, among this committee's 
first targets for rooting out Communists, fellow-travelers, socialists, or any other 
unsavory subversive types was the University.  University president Raymond B. Allen 
supported and facilitated the witch hunt on his campus in every way possible.  In a 
menacing, albeit possibly intending to be helpful gesture, before the committee arrived on 
campus, Allen warned Communist faculty members to leave their positions immediately, 
to quit their careers, before they were smoked out.1  Ultimately, eleven tenured professors 
were called before the state's committee to defend themselves.  "Professional witnesses," 
often disenfranchised ex-Party members looking to clear their names, were called in to 
offer slanderous testimony against the accused.  Among them was Whittaker Chambers, a 
former spy for the Soviet Union, who came to Washington to offer expert testimony on 
what was considered to be the intellectually-crippling nature of Communism.   In 1949, 
after years of struggling to protect their names via their constitutional rights and the 
tenets of academic freedom, three professors were deemed unfit to teach and fired: 
Joseph Butterworth, Ralph Gundlach, and Herbert Phillips. 
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 Shortly after he was fired from UW, students at the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA), invited Herbert Phillips to speak at their campus.  As Bob Blauner 
points out in his 2009 book Resisting McCarthyism: To Sign or Not to Sign California's 
Loyalty Oath, an outstanding complement to David Gardner's seminal 1967 book The 
California Loyalty Oath, this was one of three events that led UC President Robert Sproul 
to call for an amendment to the already-existing faculty-wide loyalty oath.  The two other 
events were the "loss of China" to Communism, which, according to Blauner, amplified 
fears of subversion in the United States, and the invitation of Harold Laski, a British 
Labour Party member and avowed socialist, to speak at UCLA on labor unions.  While 
the school's Left-leaning provost, Clarence Dykstra, approved Phillips' speaking 
engagement, Dean of Students Milton Hahn opposed it, based on the reasoning that "no 
recognized student organization" requested Phillips to come.2  Unless an academic 
department, or at the very least an approved student organization (one Hahn approved of) 
made the request, Hahn argued the event should be canceled.3  In the end, Phillips went 
to UCLA and participated in a debate with an audience limited to graduate students. 
 To the UC's Board of Regents, the threat Communism and its subversive rhetoric 
posed to the youth of the United States crystallized when two radical speakers, one an 
avowed Communist recently terminated from a tenured academic position, and the other 
a Labour Party member, socialist, and union supporter, were given the opportunity to use 
campus facilities to address and hold discussions with students.  The Board's now-
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infamous reaction was to amend an already-existing constitutional loyalty oath previously 
adopted with little resistance in 1942.  The amendment stated: "I am not a member of the 
Communist Party, or under any oath, or a party to any agreement, or under any 
commitment that is in conflict with my obligations under this oath."  Of course, the 
wording was intentionally ambiguous so as to allow state, federal, and university 
investigative committees ample room to find obscure violations.  The board, however, 
did not inform the faculty of the amendment, let alone seek out their approval.  It was 
simply attached to their contracts for the coming year.  Those who did not sign would 
have no teaching position.  Undoubtedly, the amended oath was a direct violation of 
academic freedom and constitutional rights, but it was actually the failure to uphold the 
rights of shared governance that truly infuriated many faculty members.  And it was this 
misjudgment that led not only to a standoff between "non-signers" and the board, but also 
to universities across the nation assessing their position on loyalty oaths, if they needed 
one, and how they should be implemented.  In the end, on August 25, 1950, thirty-one 
professors who had refused to sign the oath were fired from the University.  In October 
the following year, California's Supreme Court ordered the University to reinstate the 
non-signers. 
 Historians have discussed the UC's 1949-1950 loyalty oath controversy in great 
length, most notably David P. Gardner in his book The California Oath Controversy, and 
Ellen Schrecker in her seminal work No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism & the Universities.  
This essay, however, uses the UC scandal as a backdrop to the University of Utah's (U of 
U) own controversy concerning an alleged Communist professor.  Admittedly, my 
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decision to use the UC scandal this way is born more from necessity than creativity: 
across the nation, university administrations, regents, and faculty members followed the 
events as they unfolded in California.  Many universities adopted oaths that mimicked 
California's, with little or no protest from the faculty.  While the U of U held off from 
immediately implementing oaths, regent minutes reveal that they, too, had California on 
their mind.  As will be shown, the regents decided to include the faculty in discussions 
concerning the implementation of an oath, a decision that stemmed directly from their 
recognition of what caused so much mayhem at Berkeley.  But the board's inclusion of 
the faculty does not reflect a strong determination to uphold tenets of academic freedom.  
It is tempting to identify the regents' concern for faculty involvement as an act to preserve 
shared governance, but in actuality, the university showed little interest in upholding 
professors' rights and protections.4  The board only respected rights of shared governance 
and faculty participation so as to charge the Faculty Council with policing themselves 
and drafting their own statement supportive of the state and federal constitution in a show 
of good faith.  Shared governance and faculty involvement did nothing, however, to 
prevent a suspected Communist from being red-baited and forced out of the University, 
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despite the Faculty Council's contrary recommendations.  What I aim to show in this 
essay is how the U of U, and specifically its president A. Ray Olpin, when faced with the 
threat of a communist presence on their campus, did little to protect shared governance 
and tenure protections, two key tenets of academic freedom. 
 My research was originally focused on finding empirical evidence that during the 
same period Berkeley was embroiled in controversy over the UC's new oath requirement, 
president A. Ray Olpin promised his faculty that he would resign before allowing 
something similar to  happen at the U of U.  This is the claim Sterling McMurrin makes 
in the book Matters of Conscience: Conversations with Sterling M. McMurrin on 
Philosophy, Education, and Religion.  When asked the question "I've heard you say over 
the years that you know of no institution that defends academic freedom more fully than 
the University of Utah.  Why do you say that?", Distinguished Professor of philosophy 
Sterling McMurrin, gave this answer: 
Yes, the University of Utah has genuine intellectual freedom.  It's partly because there 
has always been a powerful interest group, the Mormon church, right on the university's 
doorstep. [University of Utah President Albert Ray Olpin] used to tell me in the 1950s of 
complaints from Mormon officials -- and others, of course, -- about what professor so-
and-so was saying in the classroom, what questionable plays were performed by the 
theater, and so on.  Without exception, Olpin was a stalwart defender of the freedom of 
his faculty.  He was almost bullheaded about it.  And, for the most part, the faculty 
exercised its academic freedom responsibly -- speaking and writing honestly without 
malice toward local institutions and interests. 
The interviewer, L. Jackson Newell, Professor of Higher Education at the University, 
encouraged McMurrin to elaborate: "I'm sure you've got an example or two in mind."  
McMurrin responds, 
One such event occurred in 1949, or possibly 1950.  There was a great deal of concern 
over the loyalty oath that California initiated, a concern which was spreading across the 
country.  There was some agitation in Utah for requiring loyalty oaths from university 
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professors.  The faculty met at Kingsbury Hall to discuss the matter and President Olpin 
said very firmly, "There will be no loyalty oaths in this university while I am president," 
and that settled that.  Thereafter loyalty oaths were a dead issue at the university and, 
generally, in the Utah community.  I would occasionally run into people -- who were not 
Utahns, incidentally -- who would ask, "When are you going to get rid of those 
communists in the university?  I said, "I don't know that we have any communists." Well, 
as a matter of fact, we did have at least one card-carrying communist at the Medical 
School; but he wasn't thrown out.  At the end of the year he simply left.5 
In fairness, Professor McMurrin was correct on more than one point: Olpin was a staunch 
defender of the university's autonomy who resisted outside influence not just from the 
Mormon church, but from the state's government, as well.  Also, loyalty oaths, which 
peppered much of the nation in 1949, were not legislatively initiated in Utah.  Utah was 
one of twenty-two states that did not require teachers to sign oaths affirming their loyalty 
to the state's and nation's constitutions, and one of fifteen which had neither an oath 
requirement or legislation aimed at removing "disloyal" teachers.6  But McMurrin's other 
points concerning president Olpin's 'bullheadedness" towards defending academic 
freedom, his stalwart position against loyalty oaths in the university, and the supposed 
meeting in Kingsbury Hall when Olpin vowed to resign before seeing oaths at the U of U 
simply do not match the historical record.  In actuality, Olpin and several other U of U 
regents engaged in an incredulous campaign of red-baiting a respected scholar out of the 
university, while at the same time, and perhaps not so subtly, insisting the rest of the 
faculty provide a sign of good faith that they were fervent supporters of the state and 
federal constitutions. 
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 The June 13, 1949, Board of Regents meeting covered an array of important, yet 
typical and somewhat bland topics: "Federal Legislation on Housing;" "Campus Building 
Plans;" "Dr. R.V. Chamberlin Engaged for Half Time."  The minutes also show that the 
United States Public Health Service recently approved the erection of a cancer research 
facility at the U of U's campus.  At this time, and arguably still today, the university's 
School of Medicine was its crown jewel.  President Olpin worked hard to attract talented 
scholars and researchers in various fields of medicine from across the country, and 
succeeded time and again.  Beyond the cancer research facility news, the minutes also 
show the regents discussed a recent letter sent from Representative John Wood, 
Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities 
(HUAC), to President Olpin.  The letter requested "lists of textbooks, with names of 
authors," from every department related to social sciences, including history, political 
science, philosophy, literature, economics, and geography.7  According to the minutes, a 
discussion on "Un-American" activities in Utah's schools and universities followed.  It 
was then agreed that the Board "must determine a guiding policy with reference to this 
whole matter as early as possible and not wait until some specific case arises.  Aware of 
the controversy taking form in California, in determining such a policy the opinion was 
expressed that it would be very wise to have the faculty participate."8 
 Members of local press outlets attended the regents' meeting that evening, and 
shortly after the discussion on HUAC's request, an unknown person questioned the Board 
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on the "likelihood of there being Communists on the University faculty."  Olpin 
responded that there was one person suspected of being Communist who would gain 
tenure if his contract was renewed for another year.  The Board, then realizing there was 
no policy in place concerning employing "persons suspected of belonging to subversive 
organizations," suggested that a qualifying statement be included in the suspect's contract, 
informing him that "employment for the ensuing year would not provide tenure."  It read: 
"Since you do not attain tenure until December, 1949, your tenure status will be open for 
discussion before it comes effective at that time."9  The motion to include this clause on 
the suspect's contract carried.  That evening, the Deseret News ran an article titled "Olpin 
Hints Teacher at 'U' Is Commie."10 
 The suspected subversive was professor of physiology Dr. James E. P. Toman.  
Toman came from a working-class family, his father a mill worker.  He attained his Ph. 
D. in biology from Princeton, and, by all accounts, was a brilliant scientist and talented 
researcher whose primary focus was finding a cure for epileptic seizures.  During his time 
at the U of U, he and three other medical scientists secured over 217 grants for the School 
of Medicine, for a total of just over two million dollars.11  He was also, according to a 
1945 article in the Salt Lake Telegram, a member of the Communist Party (CP).  The 
article identifies Toman as: "instructor, University of Utah medical school."  It also 
identifies Dr. Mark Nickerson, "research expert at the medical school," as a CP member.  
Nickerson and Toman were close friends, and Nickerson too became the subject of a red-
hunt a few years later.  While a tenured professor at the University of Michigan in 1954, 
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Nickerson, Chandler Davis, and Clement Markert were suspended for invoking their 
constitutional rights before HUAC. Nickerson was later fired.  In actuality, Nickerson 
had left the Party by 1945, for the same reason many intellectuals had: his professional 
work did not allow the time required for Party membership.12  It is unclear if Toman was 
truly a member of the CP or not at this time, or at any time for that matter, but it is clear 
that in July 1949, president Olpin believed Toman was the new Chairman of the 
Progressive Party of Utah.13  At a public hearing on rent decontrol in June 1949, Toman 
discussed the economic plight of the newly married, those with large families, and racial 
minorities.14  Toman's concern for racial minorities alone could easily have been 
identified as communistic sympathies during this period.15  Even more damningly, during 
a period of labor unrest at the University, at least one person identified Toman as "largely 
responsible" for helping workers attain a forty-hour work week.16  Therefore, strong 
evidence exists which may help prove why the U of U Board of Regents targeted Toman: 
his recent history with political agitating, mixed with HUAC's recent inquiry into the 
school's curriculum, seems to have made him a perfect scapegoat to prove the university 
would not tolerate communists in its ranks.  Toman stood out from his colleagues, even 
those who were like-minded, like Nickerson.  He was a squeaky wheel, so to speak.  And, 
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as Ellen Schrecker has stated repeatedly throughout her scholarship, the squeaky wheels 
got the grease. 
 The Board sent Toman his contract on June 23, 1949.  In the first draft, the 
contract included this additional stipulation: "Due notice of employer's right to terminate 
contract relations at the end of this year is hereby acknowledged."  On a separate sheet of 
paper, president Olpin offered Toman an alternate wording of the stipulation, "Since you 
do not attain tenure until December, your tenure will be open for discussion before it 
becomes effective at that time."  Toman crossed out the first and opted for the alternate.  
The contract was sent back to the Board on June 29.  Toman also included a note 
declaring he signed the contract under protest, and requested that his contract "and all 
relevant material be reviewed before December 1949 by the Faculty Council Committee 
on Academic Freedom and Tenure."  Toman believed the reason for the "extraordinary 
stipulation" added to his contract was due to his presumed political beliefs, as well as his 
"participation in the political life of the community."17  He argued the stipulation violated 
provision 75-1-14 (in actuality, it violated provision 75-1-4) of the Utah Annotated Code 
1943: "No political or religious test shall be required or partiality or preference shown in 
the appointment of professors, instructors, assistants, teachers, officers, or employees."18 
 Besides sending his contract to the Board, Toman also sent Olpin a personal letter 
on June 29.  In it, he eludes to a telling conversation the two had on June 23, in which 
Olpin assured Toman that his academic competence was not in question.  This is an 
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important point to recognize, but of course, it was also standard operating procedure.  An 
accused professor's intellectual competence was never questioned by investigative 
committees or university administrations, lest they be expected to show specifically how 
one's political affiliation tainted one's intellectual expertise.  Rather than academic 
competence, Olpin informed him that the question was over Toman's "participation in the 
political life of the community," which Olpin had apparently received complaints about 
from trade union officials, who also accused Toman of being Communist.  Olpin told 
Toman in this conversation that these complaints were "a source of embarrassment to the 
University."  Olpin responded to Toman's personal letter the following day, June 30, and 
cautioned Toman against speaking with others about the qualifying statement in his 
contract, as the University would not be able to protect his reputation.19  Based on the 
support for Toman soon to flood Olpin's desk, it is assumed did not heed the president's 
advice. 
 Respecting Toman's request to have the Faculty Council investigate the 
accusations against him, the Board of Regents charged the university's Faculty Council 
Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure (hereafter referred to as FCAFT) with two 
tasks: 1), "the desirability of a public statement on behalf of the University community of 
its position with respect to the rights and responsibilities of its members as citizens," and 
2), "the case of Assistant Professor James Toman."20  Minutes from the August 1, 1949, 
Faculty Council meeting more clearly reveals what the Board intended the FCAFT 
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accomplish with its first task.  If the faculty could agree on a public statement of policy 
regarding Communists in the University, "it might forestall the imposition of a loyalty 
oath."21  This statement, just over a page in length, went through several edits.  But on 
October 6, 1949, after the faculty approved its contents, the FCAFT submitted its final 
version to the Board for approval.  It extolled the "freedom of thought and inquiry, 
opportunity for presentation of all points of view, and persuasion by reason without 
coercion" that the constitutional system of the United States "has as its foundation."  It 
spoke of the university as "one of society's best agencies for thought, inquiry, and 
discovery."  And it described the teacher "as a citizen," who "should not be expected to 
surrender his liberty or give up his right either to participate in public life or to assist in 
the formulation of public opinion."  The statement ends with a final proclamation: "As 
faculty members of the University of Utah we oppose any ideology that would suppress 
freedom of thought and expression, we support the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and we adhere to those principles which insure 
democratic government and safeguard its best interests of the University."22 
 It is tempting to identify this statement as a loyalty oath, and one which falls 
somewhere in between a standard constitutional oath (the kind UC faculty members were 
required to sign in 1942, and did so with little fuss), and the more severe type that swears 
no affiliation with groups or organizations intent on the violent overthrow of the 
democratic United States (such as the UC's 1949 notorious addition to the 1942 oath).  
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According to the August 17, 1949, FCAFT minutes, Olpin deplored any and all publicity 
concerning the "alleged Communist" among the University faculty.  Wanting to stave off 
interference by any type of outside body, namely HUAC, that might investigate the 
University more deeply than a simple book request, Olpin tasked the Faculty Council 
with writing and agreeing upon a "public academic profession of faith based upon the 
American constitutional principle of freedom."23  The committee then discussed the 
effectiveness such a statement would have if the entire faculty signed, as well as whether 
the statement should be incorporated into the Faculty Regulations or attached to faculty 
contracts (as had been done at UC).  A month later, during the October 17, 1949 Board of 
Regents meeting, the board identified the statement as "a part of the Faculty Code, which 
is the faculty rules and regulations."  Olpin said the statement was not a governing 
principle, but then immediately labeled it a "guide or principles of how the academic 
interests of the University are handled."  The board then moved to adopt the statement as 
its own policy, "a statement of principles upon which tenure at the University on the part 
of the faculty members shall be permitted and carried."24  This innocuous sounding 
"statement," or "public profession of faith," or "guide or principles," resembles a 
university-implemented rather than state-legislated oath, but an oath nonetheless. 
 The entire University faculty was, if not supportive of the statement, at least 
aware of it.  It is therefore baffling that Sterling McMurrin, a U of U faculty member 
since 1948, not only apparently forgot about the faculty-wide recognition of the 
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statement's oath, but also concocted an event in which President Olpin stood in front of 
the entire faculty in Kingsbury Hall and promised them no oath would come to the 
university.  However, more important than McMurrin's alternative historical narrative is 
the language of the statement. In light of the fact that a scholar was in the middle of being 
dismissed for taking too active a role in local political matters, was being forced to "give 
up his right either to participate in public life or to assist in the formulation of public 
opinion," the statement is entirely hollow and downright troubling. 
 Despite the meaningless credo they wrote and endorsed, the FCAFT was not 
entirely incapable of understanding that, with the Toman case, the basic principles of 
academic freedom were clearly being violated.  In a September 8, 1949 letter to the 
Board, the FCAFT found no reason not to keep Toman as a member of the faculty, which 
in turn meant granting him tenure.  The Board had argued that Toman currently was, or at 
some point had been, Chairman of the Progressive Party in Utah; that earlier, he had 
involved himself in the cases of Joseph Curtis and Roy Tremayne, two Utah high school 
teachers fired for reasons similar to what caused Toman's troubles; and that he may be a 
member of the Communist Party.  The committee relied on the rights outlined in the 
AAUP's 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure to show not only that Toman 
deserved tenure, but that terminating him would violate several guidelines.  The Board, 
the letter stated, had the right to terminate anyone who had not attained tenure, but, if the 
case should go public, the nature of the reasons "might become a vital concern to the 
faculty and public."  The FCAFT realized quickly, and rightly, that the Board had no 
conclusive evidence of their accusations; in fact, months earlier, Olpin admitted as such.  
 15 
 
In a document titled "Discussion Regarding Letter Sent to Members of the Faculty 
Council regarding Contract and Tenure of Dr. James E. P. Toman," dated July 5, 1949, 
president Olpin stated, "In talking with [Toman], we felt that no formal accusation be 
made, but a great deal of talk and gossip is going around.  [Toman] should clear himself.  
We called his attention to the fact that a great deal of talk was going on."25  Moreover, the 
committee pointed out that the AAUP's 1940 statement grants probationary-period 
teachers the same rights of academic freedom as tenured faculty members.26  This meant 
that Toman should not be denied tenure due to his participation in controversial 
extramural political activities.  The minutes from FCAFT meetings reveal that regent 
members continuously tried to keep doubts about Toman alive, despite the majority of the 
Faculty Council seeing no wrong in his actions or supposed affiliations.   
 The FCAFT was not the only entity who defended Toman.  Olpin's presidential 
records contain a wide array of letters of support for the scholar, the vast majority of 
which are from his colleagues at the University's School of Medicine.  In fact, except for 
one from the United Public Workers of America, which accuses Olpin of discriminating 
against union members, every personal letter sent in support of Toman is from a School 
of Medicine colleague;27 there are none from a concerned faculty member of a different 
school or department.  But, that is not to say nobody from outside the School of Medicine 
thought he was being unfairly punished.  In fact, minutes taken from FCAFT and Board 
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of Regents meetings make it very clear he had support from many professors throughout 
various fields of study.  After all, violations of academic freedom affect all, and easily cut 
through any type of intellectual divisions or scholarly rivalries between departments.  
But, regardless of the support he was shown in the aforementioned meetings, there 
remains a distinct lack of public support for Toman's academic freedom and/or disdain 
for the Board's actions.  This is a puzzling phenomenon, given that the University had 
approximately seven-hundred professors at this time and yet not one wrote Olpin in 
disagreement, while at the same time, numerous members from the School of Medicine 
voiced their concerns in writing.28  Potential reasons for the lack of vocal support from 
members of other departments will be explored later in this essay. 
 The support for Toman that came from the School of Medicine's faculty typically 
touched on a series of major themes: 1), Toman was a brilliant researcher and scientist, 
and losing him would "represent a serious blow to the medical school's research 
program;"29 2), the Board's treatment of Toman, based on "no formal charges" but 
"rumour (sic) and innuendo," raises questions that concern every faculty member;30 and 
3), nothing in the faculty code prevents a university professor from participating in 
extracurricular events that concern the community at large.31  Even Mark Nickerson, at 
the time an associate professor of pharmacology at the University who was later red-
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baited at the University of Michigan, and who had previously been a member of the CP 
and was identified as a Communist in the same 1945 article that accused Toman, wrote 
president Olpin a letter in disagreement with the Board's actions.32  Clearly, not everyone 
who had reason to hide their past involvement with what were considered subversive 
groups and activities "kept their heads down" and kept silent. 
 Despite the School of Medicine's appeals made on behalf of Toman's skills as a 
researcher, scientist, and teacher, the Board continuously moved forward with its 
intentions to dismiss him from the University.  Minutes from the Board's weekly 
meetings show that only one regent, George S. Ballif, argued what was happening to 
Toman was not just unfair, but a violation of his constitutional rights.  And, in a special 
meeting of the Board on October 17, 1949, it became clear not just that Ballif was 
Toman's only advocate among the regents, but that Olpin was willing to go to extreme 
lengths to rid the University of him. 
 On this day, Olpin reveals to the Board that new developments have come to light 
that he thought should be "on the table" when they consider whether to grant tenure to or 
dismiss Toman.  According to Olpin, a night watchman for the School of Medicine, "one 
of our best night watchmen" who "should be commended for his frankness," was 
concerned to see people "working at all hours of the night."  Olpin was "so shocked" 
when he heard the watchman's reports that he "demanded the Superintendent of Buildings 
and Grounds" to send the watchman's reports to his office on a weekly basis, or 
immediately if "highly irregular."  Olpin suggested to the Board that two letters, sent 
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from the watchman, be read, and if desirable, he could be called in to speak in front of 
them, in case they had questions.  Regent Ballif immediately countered, asking if Olpin's 
intentions were to charge Toman in absentia, based on the watchman's report.  Olpin 
replied he was only reporting what happened.  Ballif again countered, insisting Toman 
should be allowed "under our usual democratic procedure, an opportunity to appear and 
confront his witnesses and receive the charge against him in a good old American 
democratic way."  Olpin shot back, "Well you can call him (assumedly Mr. Hansen, the 
night watchman) if you wish, but you be the judge.  I'm not."  Then, perhaps exasperated 
either by the heated exchange or the continuing talks on Toman, or both, Regent Roy 
Cox, without yet hearing Olpin's evidence, moved to terminate Toman's employment 
effective December 1, 1949.  Reed Culp seconded the motion.  Cox, clarifying his 
position towards Toman, added "Without giving any reason or bringing him in."  At this 
point, Regent Romney and Browning, possibly before supporting Cox's movement or in 
an effort to be as prudent as possible in their decision, insisted on hearing Olpin's 
evidence against Toman.  Olpin proceeded.33 
 According to Mr. Hansen's report, Toman and a "Miss Henry" had been seen 
leaving the Medical School together on a regular basis around five-thirty in the morning.  
Offering hearsay evidence to buttress his accusation, Olpin told the other regents "Now 
we all know, of course, the relationship between the two is more than professional."  
According to Hansen, while many others work late at night, Toman was a suspicious 
character because he frequently came in around midnight and stayed until the early 
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morning, which no other staff member did.  Olpin, who had apparently personally 
interviewed the night watchman, asked Hansen what they did (Toman and Miss Henry) 
while they were there, to which Hansen replied "It is my understanding they were 
working on papers."  Bizarrely, Olpin asks Hansen at this point, "What kind of papers?", 
to which Hansen replies truthfully, "I don't know what kind of papers.  I assume it is 
about their work." 
 Offering up more damning evidence, Olpin then discusses another report from a 
night watchman (it is not known if this report, too, came from Mr. Hansen) that has 
Toman and Miss Henry conversing in a room with an open door from 8-9:00 P.M.  Later, 
at 11:30 P.M., Toman was seen alone, writing in the same room, when a man came in.  
At 1:00 A.M., Toman was seen conversing with another woman the night watchman had 
not previously seen before.  It is at this point this deluge of pointless minutia becomes 
interesting, but more for Olpin's actions than Toman's.  According to the report, the 
woman seen conversing with Toman left the Medical School at 1:55 A.M., "in a grey 
Nash sedan.  The license on the car was Utah H-2944.  The woman was driving the car, 
which apparently belonged to her.  Of course we have that (assumedly the license and 
registration information) -- a strange woman being brought in at 1:30 or 2:00 o'clock in 
the morning into the building and we made an effort to find out whose car it was."  The 
car, the report continues, was registered to a man with an FBI record. 
 The watchman's findings carry on with similar inconclusive and perplexing 
information, that arguably incriminates Olpin and the Buildings and Grounds Department 
far more than Toman or Miss Henry.  At the end, Olpin makes his final proclamation, 
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that Toman's actions, coming into work late at night, talking to strange women and men, 
were "shocking."  Based on nothing but unsubstantiated hearsay evidence, he accuses 
Toman of having an unprofessional romantic relationship with his secretary, Miss Henry, 
who was in fact Toman's research assistant.  Regent Culp, who earlier seconded the 
motion to dismiss Toman on December 1, 1949, reminds Chairman Sterling Sill that a 
motion has been seconded.  "I think we all have our minds made up," he added.  At this 
moment, Ballif asks for the floor, but Olpin interrupts him, asking if Ballif wants "this 
fellow" to report or not.  It is not entirely clear who Olpin meant by "this fellow," but he 
assumedly meant the night watchman, who had been issuing reports and Olpin had earlier 
offered to bring in to address the Board directly.  Culp, however, misinterprets Olpin, 
thinking he is referring to Toman, and responds "Mr. Chairman, I don't want [Toman] in 
here.  I don't want to see him or know him."  Ballif, now granted the floor, argued that the 
Faculty Council had cleared Toman of any wrongdoing, and yet the Board continued to 
fight "this supposed communist with totalitarian methods."  Regardless of his arguments, 
based on his experience as a professor of law, a motion to terminate Toman's contract on 
December 1, 1949 carried.  Regent Bennion then moved that everything except the 
motion to not renew Toman's contract be stricken from the record, to which Ballif 
vehemently objected.  Olpin opposed the motion, confident his stance would handle any 
scrutiny.  The motion dissolved in a heated exchange between regents Bennion, 
Browning, Ballif, and president Olpin.  The meeting concluded thereafter.34  Toman sent 
his resignation letter to the Board on November 18, 1949.  Unlike many other academics 
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fired for their assumed political affiliations during this period, he had relatively little 
trouble finding a new position at the Chicago School of Medicine. 
 The Board's discussions on and actions towards Toman reveal a disturbing lack of 
concern for his constitutional rights, predominantly his First Amendment right to free 
speech.  Of course, such violations are numerous throughout American universities (and 
the country) during this period, and indeed are what define the McCarthy era as one of 
the United States' many missteps when it comes to upholding constitutional protections 
during, and despite, times of fear, confusion, and ignorance. 
 While the Board's actions are troubling, they are arguably not as shocking as the 
faculty's refusal to take a public stand against the egregious violations of academic 
freedom and civil liberties.  This distinct lack of faculty outcry highlights an important 
issue regarding their failure to protect their colleagues', and their own, rights.  While 
there is no shortage of hypotheses that could be drawn from a wide body of scholarship 
on Cold War culture to address this issue, I found it imperative to investigate the role 
religious doctrine in 1950s Utah might have played in keeping the faculty silent. 
 In his popular book The Culture of the Cold War, American Studies scholar 
Stephen Whitfield describes the important role Christian evangelism played in 
convincing a significant portion of the United States' citizenry that a nuclear apocalypse 
could be avoided with ample love for God and country, and voting Republican.  Billy 
Graham stood out among the rest, easily recognizable as the most prominent Cold War 
evangelizer.  As Whitfield points out, Graham's rhetoric "was neither otherworldly nor 
apolitical."  That is, his sermons were related to the political and cultural concerns facing 
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1950s Americans, not biblical scripture focused on getting accepted into heaven.  His 
Sunday sermons regularly warned the parishioners of communism and linked religious 
revival to helping prevent it.  At times, entire sermons were devoted to the "death-duel" 
between Christian America and the atheistic Soviet Union.35  Linking communist 
sympathies to a form of demonic possession, Graham called communism a 'satanic 
religion," capable of turning Americans into traitors and turning their backs on everything 
America had provided for them.36  Truly, perhaps nobody was better at convincing, or 
terrifying, already-scared Americans into believing Christian convictions could prevent 
Soviet espionage and nuclear war.  While technically a registered Democrat, Graham was 
anything but.  He criticized "pseudo-liberals" and their weak foreign policies; he 
supported Senator McCarthy's demand that those brought before HUAC not be allowed 
to invoke the Fifth Amendment; and he opposed any "government restrictions" that might 
prevent "freedom of opportunity."37  For Graham, Christianity and capitalism were not 
polar opposites, but natural bedfellows. 
 But Graham's evangelism was not the only Christian denomination that found a 
natural enemy in communism.  Catholicism, too, labeled communism godless and 
atheistic, and considered Bolshevism an enemy the Church was locked in mortal combat 
with.38  And, more importantly to this essay's focus, during the era of McCarthyism the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), although somewhat socialistic in its 
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roots, was a staunch opponent of communism.  David O. McKay, for example, a General 
Authority in 1949 and appointed Church president in 1951, was a devout anticommunist 
who spread his views far and wide throughout the Church.  In 1936, while many 
intellectuals were joining the Popular Front (PF) movement in opposition to fascism in 
Europe, McKay joined with Church president Heber J. Grant in issuing a public 
denouncement of communism.  To support communism, they argued, "is treasonable to 
our free institutions, and no patriotic American may become either a communist or 
supporter of communism."39  When the United States entered World War II, McKay's 
anticommunist rhetoric shifted to accommodate the nation's new enemies.  Importantly, 
in the Church's first general conference following the attack on Pearl Harbor, McKay 
decried war in principle, but found a single condition that allowed for an individual to 
fight in war on behalf of a righteous nation.  McKay argued, "To deprive an intelligent 
human being of his free agency is to commit the crime of the ages.  So fundamental in 
man's eternal progress is his inherent right to choose, that the Lord would defend it even 
at the price of war."  In fact, in post-WWII America, it was commonly asserted that what 
Communism had in common with Germany's fascism and Japan's totalitarianism was the 
deprivation of God's gift of free agency.40  Not surprisingly, that an individual might use 
his/her free agency to support socialist political policies, or even communist overthrow, 
was apparently not considered a viable manner in which to use the gift.  Inconsistencies 
aside, McKay and other figureheads provided Mormons the same vehicle for 
anticommunist fear and paranoia that Graham provided his flock.  "[Communists] are 
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anti-Christ.  They want to destroy Christianity.  There is only one way to meet them and 
that is by force, the only thing they understand."41  In addition, during the Church's 
scurrilous campaign to oust Senator Elbert Thomas in the 1950 election, Church writers 
linked capitalism to free agency, elevating the model of economics to a moral plane.  In a 
series of muckraking efforts, Thomas was made to represent atheistic socialism, while 
Wallace Bennet, a capitalist, represented "faith and freedom."42  Communism, socialism, 
and liberalism of any sort were linked to anti-American, anti-democratic values that put 
the United States in danger.  But how much were U of U professors, scholars assumedly 
devoted to objectivity and reasonability, inspired by religious rhetoric? 
 On May 31, 1949, Dean of Faculty Jacob Geerling sent president Olpin a series of 
documents cataloging the religious affiliation of university employees, arranged and 
tallied via department.  The subject heading of the packet reads "Off-campus status of 
faculty."  Unfortunately, no information on who ordered the report, nor its overall or 
general purpose, is known.  Nevertheless, while not definitive, it provides an interesting 
layer of context that may help answer questions about the significance of religious 
organizations and their influence on anticommunist ideologies.  Despite this glaring lack 
of context, the list shows a stark contrast in the ratio of Christian faculty members and 
those who chose "No preference."  The first page is an overview of the report that lists 
eight categories: Deans, Department Heads, Professors, Associate Professors, Assistant 
Professors, Instructors, Lecturers, and Coaches.  According to the tabulations, seventy-
four of these staff members were Protestant, two hundred and twenty-one were "LDS or 
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Utah graduates," and fourteen were "No preference."  Even if this report does not include 
responses from every faculty member, it still serves as a quantitative representation of 
LDS and religious faculty to non-religious.  Moreover, it is disturbingly similar to 
HUAC's request for a list of textbooks used by the social science departments.  In 
essence, the "Off-campus status of faculty" list represents an inquisitive, and perhaps 
overly invasive, administrational body keeping tabs on extremely personal information of 
its faculty that may help define their political affiliations. 
 It appears at the time of the Toman situation, the vast majority of U of U faculty 
members were Christian.  Whether this Christian majority led to a lack of support for 
Toman remains unknown.  But it is clear that during the 1950 elections the LDS church 
played a significant role in ousting the popular Democratic Senator Elbert Thomas on 
charges based solely on rumor and innuendo, very similar to charges leveled against 
Toman.  Granted, the entire faculty at the U of U was not religious.  After all, at least 
fourteen people identified themselves as "No Preference," leaving the possibility of at 
least a few seculars.  In fact, Toman was a positivist, although Olpin's report identifies no 
"No Preferences" among professors of physiology and pharmacology.43  And, as stated 
previously, there is no way of knowing conclusively if church doctrine, or the rhetoric of 
a spiritual leader, prevented the faculty from defending Toman, who was labeled a 
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communist.  However, arguably it would be intellectually irresponsible to assert religion 
had no impact whatsoever.44 
 Other than the possibility of religious convictions playing a far larger part in 
faculty silence than in other, more secular, schools, the U of U is not unique in its lack of 
faculty outcry.  At universities across the nation, in schools with likely far larger 
percentages of non-religious faculty , not to mention current and former CP, Popular 
Front, Progressive Party, and labor and union members/supporters, scholars habitually 
failed to support their colleagues accused of subversion.  There are several reasons why. 
 Ellen Schrecker identifies one previously touched upon reason as standing out as 
a "squeaky wheel."  Many scholars, like Toman, across the nation spent their spare time 
fighting for social justice issues.  Ralph Gundlach, one of the professors fired from the 
University of Washington in 1947, was a political activist and a member of more Leftist 
organizations than any other person on the school's Seattle campus.  For this reason, plus 
a feisty attitude, Gundlach stood out from his peers; he was a squeaky wheel.45  Chandler 
Davis, a squeaky wheel at the University of Michigan, was fired from the university in 
1954 and spent six months in prison for refusing to answer questions before HUAC, on 
the grounds they violated his First Amendment rights.46  Mark Nickerson was fired 
alongside Davis, although he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and did not spend time 
in prison.  These scholars and many others squeaky wheels were fired for refusing to 
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cooperate with HUAC and/or their university's investigative committee, for being 
"unfriendly witnesses," and for not naming names and participating in the witch hunts.  
With firings occurring across the country, despite protections of tenure, it is not 
surprising many scholars failed to speak out against the injustices and bring negative 
attention their way.  Many realized standing out and speaking up, or squeaking, brought a 
lot more trouble than it prevented wrongful accusations and terminations. 
 For other scholars failing to speak out against mistreatment was not a matter of 
keeping a low profile.  They were anticommunists who truly believed communism was 
either a threat to Western ideals, a morally bankrupt system of government, or both.  
Many professors within American universities were conservative, although not 
necessarily Republican; to them, communism was democracy's natural enemy.  Others 
were former CP or PF members who, for one reason or another, became disillusioned 
with communism.  After breaking from the Party, some, like Lionel Trilling and 
Granville Hicks, remained liberal, or at least non-Right.  But they formed strong 
anticommunist sentiments based on what they considered to be the inside truth about 
communism.  Others, like Whittaker Chambers, moved from the far Left to the extreme 
Right for similar reasons.  Both Trilling and Chambers, and numerous others, became 
disillusioned with what Russia had become after the revolution, a victim of Stalin's 
political repression, purges, and gulags.  Trilling wrote: "the revolutionary heroes -- and 
they were certainly that -- were disgusting.  Russia was disgusting.  Perhaps every 
revolution must betray itself."  Chambers and everybody he knew were "confused and 
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dejected."47  To these anticommunists, anyone who either stayed in the Party after 
learning of Stalin's atrocities, or refused to take as ardent an anticommunist stance as they 
had, were non-critical automatons, unfit to think for themselves, and surely unfit to teach 
America's youth. 
 Despite labeling scholars unfit to teach, HUAC and university investigative 
committees rarely, if ever, accused a professor they suspected of being communist that 
his political affiliations had poisoned his intellectual integrity.  This is evident in the 
Toman case at the U of U.  From the very onset, the Board made it clear Toman's 
"academic qualifications and research contributions" were not in doubt.  Likewise, the 
University of Michigan treated Davis, Nickerson, and Markert similarly in 1954.  The 
school's Special Advisory Committee assured each scholar that the "technical proficiency 
in [their] respective fields" was not in doubt.  Instead, what concerned the University was 
each man's "integrity."  Anticommunists saw communism as a conspiracy, whose 
members were under the complete control of the Party.48  Accordingly, went the 
rationale, communist professors may well still excel in their field of study; Toman was no 
less a physiologist as a communist, for example.  But when faced with a decision to 
make, or perhaps when fielding a question from a student that required a critical analysis 
of Party doctrine, in a Durkheimian fashion of mechanical solidarity they would 
invariably defend and spout the Party rhetoric over a reasonable and objective approach.  
Of course, no case studies or evidence of such behaviors ever existed.  In fact, it could be 
argued that in a rather automaton-like and uncritical manner, it was HUAC and the 
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university investigative committees that persecuted scholars they only suspected of being 
Communist, based largely on speculative and hearsay evidence that would have been 
thrown out in a courtroom. 
 The McCarthy era was, for all intents and purposes, conservatives picking up 
where they had left off when World War II interrupted their persistent assault against 
Communists, Leftists, unions, striking laborers, and other agitators.  Convincing the 
American citizenry that the secretive, hostile, and aggressively expansionist Soviet Union 
was spying on the United States and turning its citizens into treasonous Reds did not take 
much effort.  After helping to defeat fascism in Europe, the United States, itching to 
continue saving the world from antidemocratic regimes, found a perfect target in the 
aggressively expansionist Soviet Union.  The resulting perceived domestic threat 
Communist sympathizers posed to the democratic fabric of the nation became the 
primary concern for millions of Americans.  And, just as scholars failed to stand up 
against HUAC in the university, Democratic Americans failed to unite and stand against 
the unconstitutional methods used by HUAC to flush out and persecute suspected 
Communists.  As Ellen Schrecker points out, on a large scale, Democratic leaders simply 
did not have the nerve to publicly identify the tactics as undemocratic, unconstitutional, 
and un-American.  Republicans could too easily fire back with charges that Democrats 
were soft on Communism.  Democrats, "to defend themselves against charges that they 
were soft on Communists, flaunted their own anticommunism."49  Tragically, the 
Republicans' hostile approach to purging Communists from state and federal institutions, 
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universities, and throughout the private sector was genuinely supported by "cold war 
liberals," but went largely uncontested by various Democrats and leftists who opposed 
the methods and purpose, but felt powerless to oppose them. 
 The Democratic Party did not unite in opposition against the unconstitutional 
ways suspected Communists were hunted in the United States.  Similarly, scholars and 
intellectuals within Americans institutions of higher learning also failed to band together 
in solidarity against egregious violations of academic freedom.  In fact, many university 
members were complicit with the McCarthy era's injustices, whether liberal or 
conservative, Republican or Democrat.  Their failure to defend their colleagues forfeited 
untold amounts of intellectual progress in the process and allowed the institution to be 
fundamentally altered.  Paul Lazarsfeld's and Wagner Thielens, Jr.'s, exhaustively 
researched work The Academic Mind reveals the many ways the university changed 
dramatically.  Professors felt more pressure to drop "controversial" classes; at least half 
of the interviewed social science professors felt a decline in intellectual and academic 
freedom; at public universities, faculty reported increased pressure from politicians as 
new investigative committees were created and unleashed on the university.50  Many of 
the men and women who toiled for years to become intellectuals and scholars, dedicated 
to objectivity, critical thought, and the scientific method, ignored and defied their roles as 
educators and purveyors of truth.  Instead of standing unified on their intellectual 
foundations and defiant against unconstitutional methods of repression, many caved and 
said nothing when their colleagues were accused of activities that could, and too often 
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did, cost them their careers.  Instead of working collectively to identify and protest how 
McCarthyism violated one's rights, scholars by and large granted legitimacy to the 
antidemocratic processes that sometimes destroyed their colleagues' careers.  At the 
University of Michigan, instead of championing and defending Davis, Nickerson, and 
Markert for invoking their constitutional rights before HUAC, the university's Special 
Advisory Committee persecuted and fired two of them.  And at the University of Utah, 
instead of furiously demanding an outstanding colleague not be dismissed for charges 
stemming from gossip and rumors, the Faculty Council penned an oath and recognized 
the Board's right to do with Toman what they wished.  Again, as the preeminent Cold 
War historian Ellen Schrecker states, "The academy did not fight McCarthyism.  It 
contributed to it."51 
 President Olpin was not opposed to having the University's faculty sign a loyalty 
oath, and saying as much, in light of the historical record, is a simple misrepresentation of 
the man's stance on oaths and whether they represented to him, in any way, a violation of 
academic freedom.  Olpin is quoted as saying, "Whenever you bring in a real scholar," 
which he, without question, worked to fill his university with, "there's bound to be 
someone unhappy with his views."  But, as Olpin knew, "real scholars" (and any scholar, 
for that matter) needed to know the University would allow them "to utilize their talents 
as free-thinking individuals."52  Unfortunately, Olpin's actions against Toman show a 
distinct lack of conviction for upholding such views.  He made these statements in 1947, 
and yet two years later, he quickly turned on an agitator, a proponent of workers' rights 
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and rent control, of equal rights for people of color.  He sank deeper in his wrongful 
determination to rid the school of Toman when he found fault with Toman working late 
nights with his research assistant.  Incidentally, when Clement Markert was accused of 
being a CP member at Michigan, the excessive amounts of time he spent conducting 
research was used in his favor, not against him.  Olpin rightly deserves credit for helping 
to build the University of Utah into what it is today, but his record for actually upholding 
the rights of academic freedom and protections of tenure of one of his most talented 
scholars, when given the opportunity to do so, is dismal.  Olpin, like so many other 
acquiescent scholars and intellectuals of the McCarthy era, closely followed the status 
quo. 
 The legacy of the McCarthy era at the U of U fits similarly into the historical 
record as the liberal legacy does: closely following the status quo.  As was the case on 
most other campuses, the U of U's only contact with HUAC was comparatively minor to 
the Universities of California, Wisconsin, Michigan, and select others.  HUAC's request 
for a list of books used in various social science departments was sent without 
controversy.  There was no collective faculty outburst at the thought of being forced to 
sign a loyalty oath, which the regents' minutes show was in consideration, nor at the 
board's request the faculty author and sign the more innocuous sounding public statement 
of good faith to the state and federal constitutions.  A step in the right direction, the 
Faculty Council recommended Toman not be fired as no evidence whatsoever showed he 
was guilty of moral turpitude or any other offense, but they also recognized the Board of 
Regents as an essence of absolute authority who could do with him as they pleased.  The 
 33 
 
entire university faculty, save for a significant portion from the School of Medicine, 
stayed silent on oaths, on statements, and on the engineered dismissal of an extremely 
talented colleague.  But their behavior is indicative of the overall response scholars across 
the nation had to Communist witch hunts.  Patriotic fervor and an obsession with 
stamping out atheistic and dogmatic Communism from the institution, based on shaky 
and wildly ironic reasoning that Communists were incapable of reasonability, trumped 
protecting academic freedom.  Arguably, the McCarthy era was a bleak period for the 
United States, one of considerable fear and uncertainty towards an aggressive enemy and 
its domestic influence.  Unfortunately, instead of combating the exploitation of fears, 
universities -- and the scholars that defined them -- largely endorsed anticommunist 
paranoia.  Some schools did so on a grand scale that affected a national response.  Others, 
like the U of U, did so quietly, making few ripples in the national anticommunist current, 
but adding to the swell of anti-American political repression nonetheless. 
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